The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has brought a familiar sight back to the forefront of global attention: large-caliber artillery. As Western nations supply Ukraine with a steady stream of NATO-standard howitzers, old adversaries are once again facing off. We've seen reports of dwindling 155mm shell stocks in the West, a testament to the enduring importance of these heavy guns on the modern battlefield.
Currently, Ukrainian forces are fielding NATO's 155mm/L39 and 155mm/L52 howitzers, directly confronting Russia's 152mm/L47 and 152mm/L54 artillery. This battlefield reality has fueled a narrative: has the once-revered 152mm caliber truly fallen behind the international standard of 155mm?
Interestingly, China's own journey in large-caliber artillery mirrors this discussion. Around the turn of the century, China transitioned its main large-caliber ground artillery from 152mm to 155mm. This shift has led to a popular online theory: that the 1984 "922 Project," which introduced 155mm/L45 artillery technology, was a turning point, pulling China out of a long-standing lag and leading to a modern resurgence. However, this narrative, while appealing, doesn't quite capture the full picture.
Before the "922 Project," China had already successfully developed and produced 152mm cannons whose performance rivaled the 155mm/L45. Furthermore, the adoption of 155mm wasn't simply a matter of importing foreign tech; it involved significant domestic innovation to refine and improve what was initially a somewhat flawed "half-baked" project, ultimately leading to a world-class, serialized product line.
So, is the 152mm caliber's perceived decline solely due to its size? From a purely technical standpoint, a mere 3mm difference in bore diameter doesn't inherently create a vast chasm in capability. In fact, the 152mm, 155mm, and even the historical 150mm calibers share a common lineage, with no fundamental differences.
France played a pivotal role in the evolution of modern field artillery. The 155 L de Bange field gun, developed after the Franco-Prussian War, set a benchmark for its time and became the progenitor of a series of calibers. The 155 Grande Puissance Filloux mle 1917 cannon and the 155 C modèle 1917 Schneider howitzer, both stars of World War I, were so exceptional that many nations adopted, copied, or used them as references for their own designs.
However, differing metrology systems led to variations. Nations adopting the international metric system naturally gravitated towards 155mm. Those following the British imperial system chose the closest equivalent, 6 inches (approximately 152.4mm). Germany, preferring centimeters, opted for 15cm (which, due to bore rifling variations, often translated to an actual bore of 149.1mm). This created three closely related ammunition families: 155mm, 152mm, and 150mm.
To leverage existing designs, these adaptations aimed to maintain similar internal and external ballistics. Consequently, the chamber volume and shell weight of these copied models were based on the French 155mm howitzer round, with a standard shell weighing around 43.5kg. During World War II, most "15-series" cannons fired shells in the 40-50kg range. Given the similar propellant charges and shell designs of the era, their destructive power was largely comparable.
The post-World War II era saw the Cold War divide, leading to the standardization of weaponry within each bloc for logistical efficiency. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy's arsenals were dismantled, and the 150mm caliber faded into history. With the Marshall Plan and US military aid, most NATO countries adopted a 105mm and 155mm pairing (though the US Navy continued with 152mm until the late 1970s).
The Warsaw Pact, conversely, standardized on Soviet 122mm and 152mm calibers. However, unlike the Warsaw Pact's wholesale adoption of Soviet designs, NATO's field artillery standardization was less immediate in the 1950s. Various 155mm howitzers and cannons, including American M114, M59, British BL5.5, and French M50, were in service.
This led to the 1964 "Joint Ballistics Memorandum of Understanding" (JBMOU), or "Four Nations Ballistics Agreement," signed by the US, UK, Italy, and West Germany. This agreement aimed to unify the technical specifications for new generations of large-caliber field artillery, establishing 155mm caliber, 39-caliber barrel length, and an 18.85-liter chamber volume as the standard.
France, though not an initial signatory, also opted for a 40-caliber barrel for its next-generation 155mm artillery based on similar ballistic studies. The operational concept envisioned that the NATO 155mm/L39 would gain a range advantage over Warsaw Pact 152mm/L28 artillery (24km vs. 17.4km for standard rounds). At the army level, the US M107 175mm/L61 cannon (32.7km range) was expected to suppress Warsaw Pact M46 130mm/L52 guns.
However, NATO's 155mm/L39 towed howitzers, like the M198 and FH-70, didn't enter service until the early 1980s. Similarly, self-propelled versions like the M109A2 and AUF-1 also saw widespread deployment after 1980. In contrast, the Warsaw Pact, starting in the late 1950s, had already fielded the D-20 152mm/L28 howitzer and M46 130mm/L52 cannon, giving them an initial range advantage over their NATO counterparts.
The introduction of self-propelled howitzers like the 2S3 Akatsiya and 2S1 Gvozdika in the early 1970s further solidified this advantage. Yet, the US M107 175mm cannon's deployment in 1963 nullified the Warsaw Pact's long-range artillery advantage at the army group level.
While the Luna-M tactical rocket system (9K52) gave Warsaw Pact divisional artillery a range edge over NATO army artillery, its 500m Circular Error Probable (CEP) made it more suited for nuclear payloads than conventional ones. The Soviet response was the development of the 2S5 Hyacinth-S and 2A36 Hyacinth-B 152mm/L54 cannons (24.7km standard range, 37km rocket-assisted) and the 2S7 Pion 203mm/L59 self-propelled gun (37.5km standard range, 47.5km rocket-assisted).
By the time the BM-27 Uragan rocket system entered service in 1976, the Warsaw Pact's artillery advantage was significant. Even so, as NATO began fielding its 155mm/L39 howitzers in the 1980s, the Soviets countered with the 2S19 Msta-S and 2A65 Msta-B, equipped with 152mm/L47 cannons. While these offered a slightly shorter range (24.7km standard, 29km rocket-assisted) compared to the NATO 155mm/L39, the difference was marginal. More importantly, their Krasnopol laser-guided projectiles were comparable to the US M712 Copperhead in range and accuracy, and arguably superior in reliability and adaptability.
In response, NATO revised the JBMOU in 1987, setting 52-caliber barrel length and a 23-liter chamber volume as the standard for the next generation of 155mm artillery. This indeed widened the gap with older 152mm systems. However, these new 155mm/L52 howitzers didn't begin widespread deployment until around 2000, nearly a decade after the Soviet Union's collapse.
Therefore, the notion that NATO's 155mm artillery was definitively superior to Soviet 152mm artillery when China initiated the "922 Project" is factually inaccurate. The 155mm/L45 cannon proposed by Dr. Bull offered greater technical potential compared to China's domestic W-83 152mm cannon. Furthermore, China's development of its new 155mm artillery began in 1984, three years ahead of similar NATO projects, suggesting a parallel, if not leading, development path rather than mere imitation.
The Curious Case of the Powerful 152mm Cannon's Disappearance
It's undeniable that in 1978, China's industrial and scientific capabilities lagged behind developed nations. However, in certain cutting-edge fields with extensive preliminary research, the gap wasn't as vast as later portrayed. Many domestic projects were not far behind international trends, some even being "a kick away" from breakthroughs. With judicious adoption of foreign advanced technology, significant progress could have been made. Sadly, due to the limitations of the era, some key projects were wrongly shelved, leading to lasting regrets.
Conversely, some "superficially impressive" projects were replaced, aligning with the tide of progress. The transition of China's large-caliber howitzers from 152mm to 155mm falls into this latter category.
During a brief "honeymoon period" with Western nations, China participated as a partner in two large-caliber howitzer projects, unlike other programs like main battle tank upgrades, infantry fighting vehicle improvements, or fighter jet technology enhancements, where China acted as a customer importing foreign technology. This was because, in the field of ground-based tube-launched suppression artillery, the gap with developed nations was the smallest, and in some areas, China even held a technical advantage due to years of accumulated experience.
China's journey with large-caliber cannons began in 1958. At that time, China licensed production of three "sister guns" from the Soviet Union: the M-46, M-47, and D-74. While the 130mm/L52 and 122mm/L47 cannons received generally satisfactory feedback from the military, the largest caliber, the 152mm cannon, was criticized for its limited range of just 20km. This spurred the development of a more capable large-caliber cannon.
The domestically developed 152mm cannon, later known as one of the three "long-bearded projects" in the arms industry, underwent a protracted development. From the initial development task in November 1958, to the trial production of the D23 prototype the following year, through two project suspensions and restarts in 1965 and 1968 due to technical issues, to the second-round P23 prototype in 1966 and the third-round P23-1 in 1970. Design specifications were adjusted in August 1972 to allow a total weight of 10 tons. Subsequent prototypes included the fourth-round P23-2 in 1975 and the fifth-round P23-3 tested in July 1981. Finally, in 1983, it passed foreign trade type approval.
While the W-83 was exported to Iraq, a pre-production batch of 12 prototypes was delivered to the military for trials and participated in the Sino-Vietnamese self-defense counterattack on the Yunnan front. On November 11, 1986, the National Equipment Type Approval Committee officially approved its design, naming it the Type 86 152mm cannon.
This cannon, towed by truck or tracked vehicle, weighed 10.5 tons in transit and 9.7 tons deployed. Its dimensions were 9.6m long, 2.63m wide, and 2.2m high in transit. It could achieve 60km/h on roads and 15km/h off-road. With a barrel length-to-caliber ratio of 53.7 and a chamber volume of 30.57 liters, it operated at a maximum chamber pressure of 303.8 MPa. Its maximum range was 38km, with a rate of fire of 3-4 rounds per minute. The high-explosive fragmentation shell weighed 48kg, with a 6.44kg TNT charge, achieving a muzzle velocity of 955m/s. The crew consisted of 9-11 personnel.
Based on these basic performance parameters, the Type 86 152mm cannon not only outperformed many contemporary NATO 155mm/L39 howitzers but also surpassed the Soviet "Hyacinth" series. Its range of 30km for base-bleed cylindrical shells and 38km for base-ejector cylindrical shells was comparable to the 155mm/L45 being considered for import. Feedback from foreign customers indicated satisfaction with its projectile dispersion and power, with only its slight bulkiness and significant muzzle blast being noted as drawbacks.
However, before the Type 86 cannon completed its internal design approval, in February 1984, the Ministry of Ordnance Industry officially received approval to purchase the complete production line for the GC-45 155mm/L45 towed howitzer and its ammunition from Austria's Voest-Alpine AG. Concurrently, the Central Military Commission formally decided...
